Trouble in Turkey: Twitter, Traditionalism, and Erdogan's Power Game

Elections often create bitter divide and can sometimes make countries appear to edge toward civil conflict – what makes the difference is if players play a fair game, if they abide by just democratic principles. Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seems to be stepping further and further away from these ideals with every new twist and turn in the past few years. His most recent term has been tainted with a momentous corruption scandal followed by mass arrests of high profile figures, violent repression of the protesters in Istanbul’s central Taksim square, and most recently dabbling in people’s personal freedoms by banning both Twitter and YouTube in the run-ups to local elections.  

There are various factors that must be taken into account when analysing Turkey’s own version of an “Ottoman spring”, and overall there are four key ideas that are of particular importance throughout these events: the blocking of social media, the Gezi part protests, the split of the Gulen party from the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party), and the symbolism and legacy of the opposing CHP (Republican People’s Party).

The opposing CHP party represents the unique path Turkish politics has taken in the 20th century. It was founded officially by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1923, the man credited with creating the modern state of Turkey through a revanche of nationalism, following the fall of the Ottoman Empire following World War One. Since it's creation, it has remained one of the leading parties in Turkey, with popularity generally reflecting the appreciation of the head of the party, and ranging between 10 and 40% (see graph). Yet since Erdoğan's AKP came to power in 2002, the CHP has been unable to regain majority and election victory. This is most likely due to the powerful backing Erdoğan has received, but also due to the slow but sure increasing traditionalism that has been gaining a growing voice in Turkey. It's strong Muslim history (with the Ottoman empire dominating and controlling vast portions of the Mediterranean for over 400 years), a cold shoulder from the European Union, and the trend of a "revival", resurge of Muslim culture and values in the MENA region are all factors that have contributed to the increased popularity for Erdoğan more populist, traditionalist politics over the historically secular CHP.

The AKP on the other end of the spectrum, which has enjoyed apparently unshakable control over the country, is recently beginning to  show some cracks. Firstly to be considered is the sudden pull out of support from the Gulen movement. Headed by the Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen, who is currently residing in the US, the force began by supporting Erdoğan in his first term, however tensions have increased in the past few years and the country's leader can no longer count on this powerful ally. It must be noted that while both the Gulen movement (GM) and the AKP are religious, the two branch from different sects of Islam, and cooperation had been based more on political harmony than religious synchronization. Furthermore, differences among the two on heated matters, such as that of the Marmara flotilla incident of 2011 and over the mass corruption scandal in the summer of 2013, have only added fuel to the flames.

The increased authoritarianism of Erdoğan is something undeniable: from banning social media for political leverage during local elections to the way he violently shut down the protests over Gezi park. A ban on social media - twitter and YouTube - albeit temporary, is a move that not only diminishes his legitimacy as a democratic leader but also shows lack of understanding for the changing nature of our modern world. Indeed politicians mustn’t attempt to ban such platforms as this can only backfire: people will always find other means by which to communicate and engage with an audience, and the move makes the government seem like restricting freedom of speech is a legitimate form of governance, when in fact it is not. A lack of transparency and of taking all views into consideration, even criticism, can only hurt the AKP internally and even more so externally (projecting a harsh, un democratic image abroad). There is a unique side to this ban when it comes to Turkey, which must be noted: the infamous Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. After all, one can argue that a president has the right to avert to whatever measures he deem necessary if it is legal to do so under his nation’s law. In fact, it is the nature of this Article that I believe has allowed politicians to take advantage of it to promote their own interest. The Article makes it illegal to "insult the Turkish nation", and has been used in infamous trials against journalists and scholars that have attacked the state or some of its policies (most heatedly its denial of the Armenian genocide). Thus, loopholes in the legal system will be easily taken advantage of by savvy politicians, such as Erdoğan, especially when it comes to censorship and political selectivity. The protests in Taksim square on the other hand, that began in May 2013 as a peaceful sit-in against urban development plans for the Gezi Park in the center of Istanbul, soon turned violent when the police's response became extremely harsh. The clash quickly escalated to disagreements over the broader policies of Erdoğan's government, particularly the increased control of the state, decreased freedom of expression and secularism coming under threat.

Furthermore, in my opinion, the EU should stop playing the prize-reward game with Turkey and be more honest – accession is unlikely and unrealistic, at this time more than ever. Instead of continued promises of an eventual welcome into the Union, European leaders would do better to level with their Eastern neighbour and take on a more honest approach: we want to ensure crucial close ties, cooperation, and commerce, but membership is simply not on the horizon soon. This is not to say preferential agreements (as seen through proactive pacts such as the EU Neighbourhood policy) should not be taken positively by Ankara, they should simply not expect more as of now. Personally, I believe that Turkey, much like the Ukraine, Russia, and the Magreb will not be invited to form official part of the EU for the following reasons: firstly and crucially, the economic crisis we are undergoing has shaken the union to its very core. Current member states can barely hold on, popularity for the EU and it's institutions is at an all time low, and seriously pessimistic options are being brought to the table (possible exits for Greece and the UK, dividing the eurozone into separate currency bands, etc). At this point the EU would simply not have the means to welcome new members. The previous large wave of EU enlargement (of Eastern Europe, bringing the members to 27) has additionally strained the Union: variety makes cohesion and swift decision-making more difficult, and has also put many new pressures on the member states (such as border and migration issues). This would only increase with further expansion. I believe the issue of the EU being also a cultural union should also be stressed, and remains under-discussed. Indeed, cultural differences can already be strongly felt between North and South, East and West, Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant countries. Turkey, the bridge between Europe and Asia, and a country with a majority Muslim population and heritage might be too difficult to incorporate into an already (perhaps too) diverse Europe. Finally, Turkey's negation of past genocides and their lack of freedom of speech and expression by use of Article 301 are important themes that need improvement, and would clash too loudly with Europe's strong emphasis on human and fundamental rights.